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This paper surveys several computational interpretations of classical linear logic based on
two-player one-move games. The moves of the games are higher-order functionals in the
languageof ﬁnite types. All interpretations discussed treat the exponential-free fragment of
linear logic in a commonway. Theyonlydiffer inhowmuchadvantageoneof theplayershas
in the exponential games. We discuss how the several choices for the interpretation of the
modalities correspond to various well-known functional interpretations of intuitionistic
logic, including Gödel’s Dialectica interpretation and Kreisel’s modiﬁed realizability.
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1. Introduction
This paper surveys several interpretations [4,17,19,20] of classical linear logic based on one-move two-player (Eloise and
Abelard) games. Aswewill see, these are related to functional interpretations of intuitionistic logic such as Gödel’s Dialectica
interpretations [12] and Kreisel’s modiﬁed realizability [14].
The intuition behind the interpretation is that each formula A deﬁnes an adjudication relation between arguments pro
(Eloise’s move) and against (Abelard’s move) the truth of A. Note that we do not ask the moves of Eloise and Abelard to be
proofs (or disproofs) of A. The moves only need to be arguments, which can be thought of as incomplete proofs. In this way,
even if A is an open problem, whose proof or disproof has yet to be discovered, the game A is still well-deﬁned. If the formula
is provable, and hence true, Eloise should have no problem winning the game. On the other hand, if the negation of A is
provable, and hence A is false, Abelard should be able to extract a winning move from the refutation of A.
Thinking of the moves as incomplete proofs, it is clear that we must require both players to make their moves simultane-
ously. If one player is allowed to see what the other has chosen for his/her move, that player could simply look for the gap
in the opponent’s move and provide a counterexample for that. So, the player which is allowed to play second would in fact
have a winning strategy, even without having a complete (dis)proof of A. As a simple example, think of the ancient “Odd or
Even" game. Since neither player has a winning strategy, it is crucial that both players make their moves simultaneously.
The fact that we work with one-move games is not a restriction when the moves can be higher-order. Consider the game
of Chess, for instance. It can also be viewed as a one-move game where each of the two players writes down their strategy
as a function mapping board conﬁgurations to moves. The game then consists of the two players handing in their strategies,
which are then simulated against each other.
The interpretation of linear negation, logical connectives, quantiﬁers and exponentials corresponds to constructions for
building new games out of previously built ones. Given the symmetry of the interpretation, the game corresponding to the
linear negation of A is simply the game A with the roles of the two players swapped. In this way, linear double negation
would bring us back to the original game, which should be the case since linear negation is involutive. As we will see, the
game constructions corresponding to the logical connectives and quantiﬁers are canonical.
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In the case of the exponentials, however, the situation is quite different. It iswell known that the rules for the exponentials
do not uniquely determine thesemodalities. This is reﬂected in the ﬂexibility of interpreting the correspondingmodal games.
Nevertheless, all interpretations involve a break of symmetry in the game, giving an advantage to one of the players. How
much advantage is given separates the different interpretations. In all cases, the advantage is given in the form of one of
the players being allowed to look at the opponents move, and make a set of possible moves, rather than a single move. The
simplest interpretation of the exponential games allows this set to contain all possible moves, which is equivalent to not
making a move at all and winning the game in case a winning move exists.
The paper is organised as follows. The basic interpretation of the exponential-free fragment of classical linear logic is
presented in Section 2, and soundness of the interpretation is proved. The interpretation is characterised in Section 2.1. A
simple form of branching quantiﬁer is used for the characterisation. In Section 3, we discuss the various possibilities for the
interpretation of the exponentials.
1.1. Linear logic
Weworkwith an extension of classical linear logic to the language of all ﬁnite types. The set of ﬁnite types T is inductively
deﬁned as follows: i, b ∈ T ; and if ρ , σ ∈ T then ρ → σ ∈ T . For simplicity, we deal with only two basic ﬁnite types i (e.g.
N) and b (booleans).
We assume that the terms of LLω contain all typed λ-terms, i.e. variables xρ for each ﬁnite type ρ; λ-abstractions
(λxρ.tσ )ρ→σ ; term applications (tρ→σ sρ)σ , and conditional (z)(t0, t1). The conditional λ-term reduces to either t0 or t1
depending onwhether the boolean variable z reduces to true or false, respectively. The atomic formulas of LLω areAat, Bat, . . .
and A⊥at , B⊥at , . . . For simplicity, the standard propositional constants 0, 1,⊥, of linear logic have been omitted, since the
interpretation of atomic formulas is trivial (see Deﬁnition 3).




at , . . . via the connectives A  B (par), A ⊗ B (tensor),
A z B (if-then-else), quantiﬁers ∃xA and ∀xA, and modalities ?A and !A. The linear negation A⊥ of an arbitrary formula A is
an abbreviation as follows:
(Aat)
⊥ ≡ A⊥at (A⊥at )⊥ ≡ Aat
(∃zA)⊥ ≡ ∀zA⊥ (∀zA)⊥ ≡ ∃zA⊥
(A  B)⊥ ≡ A⊥ ⊗ B⊥ (A ⊗ B)⊥ ≡ A⊥  B⊥
(?A)⊥ ≡!A⊥ (!A)⊥ ≡?A⊥
(A z B)⊥ ≡ A⊥ z B⊥.
So, (A⊥)⊥ is syntactically equal to A. As usual, we write AB as an abbreviation for A⊥  B. We will denote by pLLω (pure
LLω) the fragment of LLω without the exponentials, and by LLωqf and pLL
ω
qf the corresponding quantiﬁer-free fragments.
Table 1
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Table 2
Intuitionistic logic ILω .
{. . . , Aat , . . . }  Aat (id)





Γ  A t B
Γ  B
(rf )
Γ  A f B
Γ , A  C
(lt)
Γ , A t B  C
Γ , B  C
(lf )
Γ , A f B  C
Γ [γ 0]  A Γ [γ 1]  B
(z)
Γ [(z)(γ 0 , γ 1)]  A z B
Γ [γ 0], A  C[c0] Γ [γ 1], B  C[c1]
(z)
Γ [(z)(γ 0 , γ 1)], A z B  C[(z)(c0 , c1)]
Γ , A  B
(→r)







Γ  A Γ , B  C
(→l)
Γ , A → B  C
Γ , A  B
(∀l)
Γ ,∀zA  B
Γ , A  B
(∃l)
Γ , ∃zA  B
The formal system for classical linear logic that we will use in this paper is presented in Table 1. The contexts Γ and Δ
are sequences of formulas (possibly with repetitions). The structural rules of linear logic (ﬁrst row) do not contain the usual
rules of weakening and contraction. These are added separately, in a controlled manner via the use of modalities (bottom
row). We also have the usual side-condition in the rule (∀) that the variable z must not appear free in Γ .
Note that we are deviating from the standard formulation of linear logic, in the sense that we use the if-then-else logical
constructor A z B instead of standard additive conjunction and disjunction.1 The logical rules for A z B are shown in
Table 1. The standard additives can be deﬁned as
A ∧ B :≡ ∀zb(A z B)
A ∨ B :≡ ∃zb(A z B)
with the help of quantiﬁcation over booleans. For more information on linear logic see Girard’s original papers [10,11].
1.2. Intuitionistic logic
Table 2 describes a formal system for intuitionistic logic in all ﬁnite types, which also uses the if-then-else connective,
rather than the usual conjunction and disjunction. In the case of intuitionistic logic, the context Γ is a set of formulas (rep-
etitions and order are not relevant). We will be making use of the following variation of Girard’s embedding of intuitionistic
logic into linear logic with conditionals.
Deﬁntion 1 [10]. For any formula A of intuitionistic logic its linear translation Al is deﬁned inductively as
Alat :≡ Aat
(A z B)l :≡ Al z Bl
(A → B)l :≡ !AlBl
(∀xA)l :≡ ∀xAl
(∃xA)l :≡ ∃x!Al.
The translation above is such that A0, . . . , An  B is derivable in ILω if and only if (!Al0)⊥, . . . , (!Aln)⊥, Bl is derivable in
LLω . We will also consider the following forgetful translation of intuitionistic logic into linear logic.
Deﬁntion 2. For any linear logic formula A in the image of the translation (·)l its intuitionistic translation Ai is deﬁned
inductively as
1 See Girard’s comments in [10] (p. 13) and [11] (p. 73) on the relation between the additive connectives and the if-then-else construct.
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Aiat :≡ Aat
(A z B)i :≡ Ai z Bi




The translation (·)i works as an inverse of (·)l , i.e. A ≡ (Al)i, for any formula A of intuitionistic logic, where ≡ denotes
syntactic equality.
For the rest of the paper we use bold face variables f , g, . . . , x, y, . . . for tuples of variables, and bold face terms a, b, . . . ,
γ , δ, . . . for tuples of terms. Given sequence of terms a and b, by a(b), we mean the sequence of terms a0(b), . . . , an(b).
Similarly for a[b/x].
2. Basic interpretation
In this section, we will describe the interpretation of the pure fragment of classical linear logic. The interpretation of
the exponentials is treated in Section 3. To each formula A of the exponential-free fragment of linear logic we associate a
quantiﬁer-free formula |A|xy, where x, y are fresh-variables not appearing in A. Intuitively, the interpretation of a formula A
is a two-player (Eloise and Abelard) one-move game, where |A|xy is the adjudication relation of the game. Eloise and Abelard
simultaneously make moves x and y, respectively, and Eloise wins if and only if |A|xy holds. For instance, in the game “Odd of
Even" the adjudication relation is “x + y is odd" (assuming Eloise is playing odd). We want that Eloise has a winning move
whenever A is provable in LLω . Moreover, the linear logic proof of A will provide Eloise’s winning move a and a veriﬁcation
of this fact, i.e. a proof of ∀y|A|ay. The interpretation of formulas of linear logic as adjudication relations is deﬁned inductively
on the structure of the formulas as follows.2
Deﬁntion 3 (Basic interpretation [19,20]). Assume we have already deﬁned |A|xy and |B|vw , we deﬁne
|A  B|f ,gy,w :≡ |A|f wy  |B|gyw
|A ⊗ B|x,vf ,g :≡ |A|xf v ⊗ |B|vgx
|A z B|x,vy,w :≡ |A|xy z |B|vw
|∀zρA|fy,z :≡ |A|f zy
|∃zρA|x,zf :≡ |A|xf z.
The interpretation of atomic formulas are the atomic formulas themselves, i.e.
|Aat| :≡ Aat
|A⊥at | :≡ A⊥at .
Notice that for atomic formulas the tuples of witnesses and challenges are both empty. It is easy to see that |A⊥|yx ≡ (|A|xy)⊥.
Let us brieﬂy motivate this choice of interpretation. Assume we have already deﬁned the games A and B, i.e. we have
adjudication relations |A|xy and |B|vw . Consider, for instance, the adjudication relation for the game A  B. In this case, we are
giving Eloise a certain advantage, since her move in game A can be depend on Abelard’s move in game B, and her move in
game B can depend on Abelard’s move in game A. The dependence on Eloise’s move is formalised by allowing her move in
the game A  B to be a pair of functionals f , g. The reason for this cross-dependence is that she might not have a winning
move for the game A nor for the game A⊥, and yet we expect her to easily win the game A  A⊥. The cross-dependence
allows a pair of simple copy-cat moves (f , g being identity functions) to be her winning move. A symmetric situation occurs
in the game A ⊗ B, only that now Abelard has the advantage and can easily win the game A ⊗ A⊥, as expected.
Given that AB is an abbreviation for A⊥  B, in particular we have that the adjudication relation for the game AB is
|AB|f ,gx,w ≡ |A|xfw|B|gxw .
2 Wewill make use the language of linear logic itself to describe the adjudication relations. If onewishes, a further embedding of linear logic into classical
logic would give a semantics for linear logic. Due to the fact that the embedding of linear logic into classical logic is not faithful, however, the semantics
will be sound but not complete.
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The game A z B is simply a ﬂagged disjoint union of the games A and B. More precisely, the game A z B is either the
game A or the game B, depending on the boolean ﬂag z. Since the moves in the games A and B might be of different types,
we ask the players to make moves in both games, although only one of their moves will be actually used.
Finally, the quantiﬁer games can be viewed as a family of games parametrised by zρ . In the case of the game ∀zA(z)
for instance, Abelard chooses which game in the family he wants to play (by choosing z) while Eloise is allowed to make
a conditional move (in the form of a functional f ) which produces her move in the game A(z) for each given z. Again, a
symmetric situation occurs in the game ∃zA(z): Eloise chooses one of the games and Abelard has to be prepared for any
possible choice of Eloise.
The following theorem formalises the intuition that Eloise’s winningmove in the game |A|xy can be extracted from a proof
of A in classical linear logic (exponentials treated in Section 3).
Theorem 1 (Soundness). Let A0, . . . , An be formulas of pLLω , with z as the only free-variables. If
A0(z), . . . , An(z)
is provable in pLLω then terms a0, . . . , an can be extracted from this proof such that
|A0(z)|a0y0 , . . . , |An(z)|anyn
is also provable in pLLωqf , where FV(ai) ∈ {z, y0, . . . , yn}\{yi}.
Proof. See [17]. 
Remark 1 (Semantics). Note that the interpretation described above gives rise to a semantics for pure linear logic: simply
replace linear logic connectives by classical connectives in the interpreted formulas:
|A  B|f ,gy,w :≡ |A|f wy or |B|gyw
|A ⊗ B|x,vf ,g :≡ |A|xf v and |B|vgx
|A z B|x,vy,w :≡ if z then |A|xy else |B|vw
|∀zρA|fy,z :≡ |A|f zy
|∃zρA|x,zf :≡ |A|xf z.
A formula A is said to be “true" if Eloise has a winning move for the game |A|xy, for any given assignment of one-move
two-player games to atomic formulas.
2.1. Characterisation of basic interpretation
In this section, we investigate the characterisation of the interpretation given above. More precisely, we ask the question:
for which extension of pure linear logic it is the case that if there are terms a0, . . . , an such that
|A0(z)|a0y0 , . . . , |An(z)|anyn
is provable then the sequent A0, . . . , An is also provable? In other words, we have seen how provability in pure linear logic
gives rise to a winning move for Eloise. What can we say about the converse? How do we turn a winning move of Eloise for
the symmetric game |A|xy into a proof of A?
We can only answer these questions once we understand precisely how provability of the formula A relates to winning
moves for Eloise in the game |A|xy. Since the provability of A gives a winning move for Eloise in the corresponding game,
we would be tempted to think that a formula A is interpreted as the existence of a winning move for Eloise, i.e. that A is
equivalent to ∃x∀y|A|xy. If that were the case, then A⊥ would be equivalent to ∃y∀x(|A|xy)⊥, since |A⊥|yx ≡ (|A|xy)⊥. Hence,
the trivial theorem A  A⊥ would be equivalent to ∃x∀y|A|xy  (∀y∃x|A|xy)⊥, which is not always true.
The problem can be solved if we take seriously the fact that a formula A is interpreted as a symmetric game |A|xy between
the twoplayers,where the playersmustmake theirmoves simultaneously. That can be done using a simple formof branching
quantiﬁer to ensure that no player has an advantage over the other. Therefore, assume that for all sequences of variables of
ﬁnite type x and y, we can form a new formula
Æx
y A, and let us refer to these as simultaneous quantiﬁers. In the same way
that a formula ∃x∀y|A|xy can be interpreted as a gamewhere Eloise makes amove x and then Abelard chooses his move y, the
formula
Æx
y |A|xy corresponds to the gamewhere both players choose theirmoves simultaneously.With the help of this simple
branching quantiﬁer we can, for instance, describe the “Odd or Even" game in terms of the formula
Æn
m(n + m is even). The
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Table 3
Systems of linear logic.
Symbol System
pLLω Pure linear logic
sLLω Pure linear logic with simultaneous quantiﬁer
sLL∗ sLLω + (ACs) + (ACp)
simultaneous quantiﬁer can be viewed as a simpliﬁcation of Henkin’s (branching) quantiﬁer [5,13], in which no alternation
of quantiﬁers is allowed on the two branches.3
It was shown by Ehrenfeucht (cf. [13]) that Henkin’s quantiﬁer can be used to deﬁne the quantiﬁer “there exists inﬁnitely
many". It follows from a result of Mostowski [15] that the classical predicate calculus extended with Henkin’s quantiﬁer
is not axiomatisable.4 Since linear logic does not have a standard truth semantics, it is impossible to talk about a standard
axiomatisation of the simultaneous quantiﬁer over pLLω . Nevertheless, as we will see, the following derivation rule is sound
and complete with respect to the game semantics (cf. Remark 1) outlined above:










with the side-condition: yi may only appear free in the terms aj , for j /= i. In particular, we will have that each yi will not be
free in the conclusion of the rule. Note that xi, yi are sequences of variables, and ai are sequences of terms.
The standard quantiﬁer rules can be obtained from this single rule. The rule (∀) can be obtained in the case when only the
tuple yn is non-empty. The rule (∃) can be obtained in the case when only the tuple xn is non-empty. Hence, for the rest of
this section we will consider that standard quantiﬁers ∀xA and ∃xA are in fact abbreviations for ÆxA and ÆxA, respectively.




⊥ ≡ Æyx A⊥
and corresponds precisely to the switch of roles between the players. Let us refer to the extension of pLLω with the new
simultaneous quantiﬁer by sLLω (Table 3).
Theorem 2 [18]. Consider the extension to the system sLLω of the interpretation given in Deﬁnition 3, where the simultaneous
quantiﬁer is interpreted as
| ÆvwA(v, w)|f ,vg,w :≡ |A(v, w)|f wgv .
Theorem 1 holds for the extended system sLLω , where the verifying system is still pLLωqf.
In fact, since the simultaneous quantiﬁers are eliminated, we obtain an interpretation of sLLω into pLLωqf . In particular, this
implies that the rule suggested above is sound. Let us proceed now to deﬁne a further extension of sLLω which is complete
with respect to the interpretation of Section 2. Consider the following principles for the simultaneous quantiﬁer
ACs : ∀z Æxy Aqf(x, y, z) Æfy,zAqf(f z, y, z)
ACp : Æxy Aqf(x)  ÆvwBqf(v) Æf ,gy,w(Aqf(f w)  Bqf(gy))
for quantiﬁer-free formula Aqf and Bqf . We refer to these as the sequential choice ACs and parallel choice ACp. For those familiar
with the usual functional interpretations of intuitionistic logic, the principle ACs corresponds to the standard (intentional)
axiom of choice, while ACp is a generalisation of the independence of premise principle (case when tuples y and w are
empty). It is an easy exercise to check that the converse of the two implications above can be derived in sLLω .
Let us denote by sLL∗ the extension of sLLω with these two extra schemata ACs and ACp. These extra principles are all
one needs to show (over sLLω) the equivalence between A and its interpretation Æxy |A|xy. One then obtains the following
characterisation theorem.
Theorem 3. Let A be a formula in the language of sLLω. Then A is derivable in sLL∗ if and only if |A|ty is derivable in pLLωqf , for
some sequence of terms t.
3 See Bradﬁeld [6] as well, where this simple form of branching quantiﬁer is also used.
4 Mostowski uses that the ring of integers is not axiomatisable, and that a non-densely ordered ring is isomorphic to the ring of integers if and only if for
each positive x there are ﬁnitely many elements between 0 and x.
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3. Interpretations of the exponentials
The exponential-free fragment of LLω , despite its nice properties, bears little relation to the standard logical systems of
classical and intuitionistic logic. In order to recover the full strength of classical logic, we need to add back contraction and
weakening. These are recovered in linear logic in a controlled manner, with the help of modalities (exponentials) ?A and !A.
The exponentials are dual to each other, i.e.
(?A)⊥ ≡ !A⊥ (!A)⊥ ≡ ?A⊥.
Girard points out in several places (cf. [11] (p. 84)) that these modalities, contrary to the other connectives, are not
canonical. More precisely, if we add newmodalities ?′A and !′Awith the same rules as shown in Table 1, we will not be able
to derive the equivalences ?A ↔ ?′A and !A ↔ !′A. This is reﬂected in the ﬂexibility (discussed below) with which we can
interpret these modalities.
In terms of games,wewill see that the exponentials correspond to a break of symmetry between the two players, allowing
one player to see the opponent’s move before making his/her move. Besides the advantage of allowing one of the players to
play second, the exponential can be interpreted in such a way that the favoured player can play a set of moves, rather than a
single move. If ρ is the type of the move in question, let us write ρ∗ for the type corresponding to the sets of moves of type
ρ (i.e. ρ∗ ⊆ P(ρ)). The choice of how big we allow that set of moves to be determines the interpretation. As we will see,
for instance, we can choose the set of moves to be the whole type (ρ∗ ≡ {ρ}), ﬁnite sets (ρ∗ ≡ Pﬁn(ρ)), sets with common
majorant (see Section 3.5), or singleton sets (ρ∗∼=ρ).
Let us start by analysing which are the allowed sets of subsets ρ∗ that give rise to proper interpretations (cf. [16]). We
do that by considering an abstract interpretation where the choice of sets is left open, and only certain conditions are put
on these sets. In the remaining subsections we will look at particular choices which are related to well-known functional
interpretations of intuitionistic logic (see Fig. 1). For each ﬁnite type ρ let ρ∗ be a new abstract type. Moreover, for each
formula A, let ∀xρ  aρ∗A and ∃xρ  aρ∗A be formula abbreviations such that
(∃x a A)⊥ ≡ ∀x a A⊥ (∀x a A)⊥ ≡ ∃x a A⊥.
A formula A is called  -ﬁxed if it does not contain unbounded quantiﬁers and all bounded quantiﬁers ∀x a A and
∃x a A are immediately preceded by a ! and ?, respectively. For each  -ﬁxed-formula A, assume we have sequence of
terms , η and μ such that the following sequents are derivable:
(D) !∀y ηx A(y)  A(x)
(C) !∀y y0y1 A(y)  !∀y yi A(y) (i ∈ {0, 1})
(P) !∀yμhw A(y)  !∀xw !∀y hx A(y).
The provability sign in the conditions stands for provability in the system under which the functional interpretation will be
veriﬁed, which might be an extension of LLω .
Intuitively, the ﬁrst condition says that for any type ρ wemust have an injection η into ρ∗. Condition (C) says that for any
two sets in ρ∗ there is a bigger set which includes both. Finally, condition (P) corresponds to a collection principle which
says that any collection of sets hx parametrised by a bounded xw can be uniformly bounded.
We can then show that, for any formula abbreviation satisfying conditions (D,C,P), a functional interpretation of classical
linear logic can be obtained by deﬁning the interpretation of the exponentials as
|!A|xf :≡ !∀y f x |A|xy
|?A|fy :≡ ?∃x f y |A|xy.
The conditions (D, P) are used to ensure the soundness of the dereliction and promotion rules, respectively. The condition
(C) is used for the soundness of the contraction rule. The rule of weakening only needs that ρ∗ is not empty, so that ∀x a A









Fig. 1. Deriving functional interpretations of intuitionistic logic.
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3.1. Interpretation 1: Kreisel’s modiﬁed realizability
The ﬁrst alternative for the interpretation of the exponentials we consider is one in which the game ?A gives maximal
advantage to Eloise, and game !A gives maximal advantage to Abelard. The maximal advantage corresponds to the player in
question not needing to make any move, with their best possible move being played for them. This corresponds to allowing
the move of the player to be the whole set of possible moves. More precisely, the interpretation is deﬁned as:
Deﬁntion 4. Extend the interpretation given in Deﬁnition 3 as
|!A|x :≡ !∀y|A|xy
|?A|y :≡ ?∃x|A|xy.
It is easy to see that Theorem1 still holdswhenDeﬁnition 3 is extended in thisway. Note, however, that once exponentials
are treated as in Deﬁnition 4, the relation |A|xy is no longer quantiﬁer-free. Nevertheless, it is the case that formulas in the
image of the interpretation (we call these ﬁxed-formulas) are also in the kernel of the interpretation. More, precisely, if A is in
the kernel of the interpretation then |A| ≡ A. The completeness result of Section 2.1 needs to be calibrated, as the schemata
ACs and ACp need to be taken for all ﬁxed-formulas (and not just quantiﬁer-free formulas). Moreover, we need an extra
principle
TA : ! Æxy A∃x!∀yA
called trump advantage, for ﬁxed-formulas5 A, in order to obtain the equivalences involving exponentials, i.e. equivalence
between !A and its interpretation ∃x!∀yA. The principle TA in particular implies that the modality ! commutes with the
existential quantiﬁer, i.e. !∃xA ↔ ∃x!A.
We have shown [17] that when combined with the embedding of intuitionistic logic into linear logic, this choice for the
interpretation of the exponentials corresponds to Kreisel’s modiﬁed realizability interpretation [14] of intuitionistic logic.
This result is rephrased in the theorem below. For an introduction to modiﬁed realizability see Chapter III of [22] or the book
chapter [23].
Theorem 4 (Kreisel’s modiﬁed realizability). Let |A|xy be as in Deﬁnitions 3 and 4. For formulas A of intuitionistic logic let us
deﬁne
x mr A :≡ (|!Al|x)i
where (·)l and (·)i denote the embeddings described in Section 1.2. The following equivalences hold intuitionistically:
x, v mr (A ∧ B) ⇔ (x mr A) ∧ (v mr B)
x, v, z mr (A ∨ B) ⇔ (x mr A) z (v mr B)
f mr (A → B) ⇔ ∀x((x mr A) → (f x mr B))
x, z mr ∃zA ⇔ x mr A
f mr ∀zA ⇔ ∀z(f z mr A).
3.2. Interpretation 2: Gödel’s Dialectica interpretation
The most restricted interpretation we consider is the one where the favoured player has to choose a singleton set in the
exponential game. Therefore, the only head-start will be to be able to see the opponents move. Based on the opponent’s
move the player will then have to make a single move. This leads to an extension of the interpretation given in Deﬁnition 3
with the interpretation of the exponentials as:
Deﬁntion 5. Extend Deﬁnition 3 as
|!A|xf :≡ !|A|xf x
|?A|fy :≡ ?|A|f yy
where we are identifying the singleton sets (i.e. f x and f y) with their unique element.
Note that in this case the target of the interpretation is again a quantiﬁer-free calculus (as in the basic interpretation of
Section 2). For the soundness, however, we must assume that quantiﬁer-free formulas are decidable in order to satisfy the
contraction rule, sincewemust choose one among two singleton sets of potentialwitnesses. The soundness of theweakening
5 Althoughwe only need the principle TA for ﬁxed-formulas in order to obtain the characterisation,modiﬁed realizability actually interprets this principle
for arbitrary formulas A.
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rule, and the rules (!) and (?) is trivial. Besides being sound for the principles ACs,ACp (Section 2.1) and the principle TA
(Section 3.1) the Dialectica interpretation of LLω will also be sound for the following principle:
MPD : ∀x!A !∀xA
for quantiﬁer-free formulas A. This is the linear logic counterpart of the semi intuitionistic Markov principle. In fact, these
are all the extra principles needed to show the equivalence between A and its Dialectica interpretation
Æx
y |A|xy (see [17,18]).
This interpretation corresponds to Gödel’s Dialectica interpretation [1,12] of intuitionistic logic, used in connection
to a partial realisation of Hilbert’s consistency program: the consistency of classical ﬁrst-order arithmetic relative to the
consistency of the quantiﬁer-free calculus T. This correspondence is formalised in the following theorem.
Theorem 5 (Gödel’s Dialectica interpretation). Let |A|xy be as in Deﬁnitions 3 and 5. For formulas A of intuitionistic logic let us
deﬁne
Ad(x; y) :≡ (|Al|xy)i.
The following equivalences hold intuitionistically:
(A ∧ B)d(x, v; y, w, z) ⇔ Ad(xz; y) z Bd(vz;w)
(A ∨ B)d(x, v, z; f , g) ⇔ Ad(x; f xvz) z Bd(v; gxvz)
(A → B)d(f , g; x, w) ⇔ Ad(x; gxw) → Bd(f x, w)
(∀zA)d(f ; y, z) ⇔ Ad(f z; y)
(∃zA)d(x, z; f ) ⇔ Ad(x; f xz).
This is not exactly how Gödel deﬁned his Dialectica interpretation [12], but it is equivalent. In the case of conjunction
and disjunction, the extra boolean information z given to the functionals is irrelevant, since each functional will only be
applied when the boolean is either true or false. The equivalence between the two different interpretations of disjunction
and existential quantiﬁers is discussed in the following theorem.
Theorem 6. Let AD be the interpretation of A as in Gödel’s original deﬁnition of the Dialectica interpretation. Then A
D ≡
∃v∀wAD(v;w) is intuitionistically equivalent to ∃x∀yAd(x; y).
Proof. Using the characterisation principles for the Dialectica interpretation of intuitionistic logic we can show that
∃v∀wAD(v;w) ↔ A ↔ ∃x∀yAd(x; y).
We ﬁrst look at the proof of the implication
(∗)∃v∀wAD(v;w) → ∃x∀yAd(x; y).
By theDialectica interpretationwe can eliminate the characterisationprinciples from this proof and at the same timeproduce
terms t, s such that
∀v, y(AD(v; svy) → Ad(tv; y))
is derivable in pure intuitionistic logic. But this in particular implies that (∗) is provable in pure intuitionistic logic. The
implication from right to left can be proved similarly. 
3.3. Interpretation 3: Diller–Nahm interpretation
We have seen two extreme interpretations of the exponential games. One in which the favoured player can try any of
his possible moves (Section 3.1) and the other where he/she chooses a single move (Section 3.2). Another possibility for the
interpretation is to give the player in question a restricted advantage by allowing the player to see the opponent’s move
and then select a non-empty ﬁnite set of moves.6 If any of these is a good move the player wins. This leads to the following
interpretation of the exponentials:
Deﬁntion 6. Extend Deﬁnition 3 as
|!A|xf :≡ !∀y∈ f x |A|xy
|?A|fy :≡ ?∃x∈ f y |A|xy
where f x and f y are ﬁnite sets.
6 Allowing the set of moves to be empty corresponds to allowing the player to choose to “surrender" (see [3]).
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Again, this extension of Deﬁnition 3 makes the Soundness Theorem 1 valid for full classical linear logic. It is clear that in
this case enough term construction needs to be added to the verifying system in order to deal with ﬁnite sets of arbitrary
type. This choice for the treatment of the exponentials corresponds to a variant of Gödel’s Dialectica interpretation due to
Diller and Nahm [7], as formalised in the following theorem.
Theorem 7 (Diller–Nahm interpretation). Let |A|xy be as in Deﬁnitions 3 and 6. For formulas A of intuitionistic logic let us deﬁne
Adn(x; y) :≡ (|Al|xy)i.
The following equivalences hold intuitionistically:
(A ∧ B)dn(x, v; y, w, z) ⇔ Adn(xz; y) z Bdn(vz;w)
(A ∨ B)dn(x, v, z; f , g) ⇔ ∀y∈ f xvz Adn(x; y) z ∀w∈gxvz Bdn(v;w)
(A → B)dn(f , g; x, w) ⇔ ∀y∈gxw Adn(x; y) → Bdn(f x, w)
(∀zA)dn(f ; y, z) ⇔ Adn(f z; y)
(∃zA)dn(x, z; f ) ⇔ ∀y∈ f xz Adn(x; y).
As in the case of Gödel’s Dialectica, the interpretation derived above is intuitionistically (but not syntactically) equivalent
to the one introduced by Diller–Nahm [7].
3.4. Interpretation 4: Stein’s interpretation
In Interpretation 1 we considered the case where the favoured player can choose the set of all possible moves, whereas
in Interpretation 3 only ﬁnite sets were allowed. The whole set ρ can be identiﬁed with the identity map of type ρ → ρ ,
while ﬁnite sets of elements of type ρ can be viewed as partial functionsN→ ρ with a ﬁnite support. In both cases we have
a family of objects of type ρ where the indexing set is either ρ or a ﬁnite subset ofN.
A hybrid interpretation between these two options can also be given for each natural number n, where n controls the
type level from which we should use option 3 (Diller–Nahm), and up to which level we should choose option 1 (modiﬁed
realizability). In other words, the kind of subsets of ρ we allow are those which can be indexed by the pure type n, i.e.
elements of n → ρ . Note that if the type level of ρ is less or equal to n then the whole set ρ is also an allowed move. Only
when the type level of ρ is bigger than n we have a restricted move for the favoured player. The slogan is “only higher-type
objects are witnessed".
Given a tuple of variables x, we will denote by x the sub-tuple containing the variables in x which have type level ≥ n,
whereas x denotes the sub-tuple of the variables in xwhich have type level< n. In the following we identify n ∈ Nwith the
pure type of type level n. Let us write ∀y∈ rng(bn→ρ)A[y] and ∃y∈ rng(bn→ρ)A[y] as abbreviations for ∀inA[bi] and ∃inA[bi],
respectively.
Deﬁntion 7. For any ﬁxed pure type n, extend Deﬁnition 3 as
|!A|xf :≡ !∀y∈ rng(f x)∀y |A|xy
|?A|fy :≡ ?∃x∈ rng(f y)∃x |A|xy.
Note that ifn = 0 the interpretation above corresponds toDeﬁnition 6where “ﬁnite sets" are replaced by “countable sets",
whereas in the limit (n = ∞) this coincides with that given in Deﬁnition 4. The interpretation of Deﬁnition 7 corresponds
to Stein’s interpretation [21], and again leads to a sound interpretation of full classical linear logic.
Theorem 8 (Stein’s interpretation). Let |A|xy be as in Deﬁnitions 3 and 7. For formulas A of intuitionistic logic let us deﬁne
As(x; y) :≡ (|Al|xy)i.
The following equivalences hold intuitionistically:
(A ∧ B)s(x, v; y, w, z) ⇔ As(xz; y) z Bs(vz;w)
(A ∨ B)s(x, v, z; f , g) ⇔ ∀y∈ rng(f xvz)∀y∀w∈ rng(gxvz)∀w
(As(x; y) z Bs(v;w))
(A → B)s(f , g; x, w) ⇔ ∀y∈ rng(gxw)∀y As(x; y) → Bs(f x, w)
(∀zA)s(f ; y, z) ⇔ As(f z; y)
(∃zA)s(x, z; f ) ⇔ ∀y∈ rng(f xz)∀y As(x; y).
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3.5. Interpretation 5: bounded functional interpretation
The interpretations presented in the previous sections are straightforward instantiations of the parametrised interpreta-
tion, in the sense that the choice of ρ∗ suggests natural terms η,  and μ satisfying conditions (D,C,P). Consider, however,
choosing ρ∗ as the subsets of ρ which are deﬁned by a majorant (in the sense of Bezem [2]), i.e. let
ρ∗ :≡ {{x : x ≤∗ y} : yρ monotone},
where x ≤∗ y denotes Howard–Bezem’s strong majorizabilty relation between functionals (cf. [2]), and y being monotone
(self-majorizable) is deﬁned as y ≤∗ y. Let us abbreviate quantiﬁcations over monotone objects as ∀˜aA and ∃˜aA (cf. [8,9]).
Unfortunately, there are a couple of problems with this choice of ρ∗. First of all, in general, we do not have functionals
η producing for each x a functional which majorizes x. We get into similar problems when trying to satisfy conditions (C)
and (P). A possible solution is to ensure that all functionals involved are monotone, since in this case conditions (D,C,P)
can be easily satisﬁed: take η,  and μ to be the identity functional, the pointwise-maximum and functional application,
respectively. We can enforce that all objects we are dealing with are monotone by working with “majorants of witnesses"
instead of “actual witnesses". This involves changing the interpretation of the quantiﬁers as:
|∃zρA|x,af :≡ ∃z≤∗ a |A|xf a
|∀zρA|fy,a :≡ ∀z≤∗ a |A|f ay .
In this way, we can restrict quantiﬁcations over a to monotone quantiﬁcations, without losing generality. If we also add to
the language bounded quantiﬁers, and interpret them as7
|∃zρ ≤∗ t A|xy :≡ ∃z≤∗ t |A|xy
|∀zρ ≤∗ t A|xy :≡ ∀z≤∗ t |A|xy
the interpretation of quantiﬁers above corresponds to a combination of the standard interpretation (Section 2) with a prior
relativisation of the quantiﬁers to Bezem’s modelM of stronglymajorizable functionals [2]. More precisely: for each formula
A of LLω let [A] be obtained inductively as
[Aat] :≡ Aat, for atomic formulas
[AB] :≡ [A][B], for  ∈ {⊗,  , z }
[A] :≡ [A], for  ∈ {!, ?}
[∀xA(x)] :≡ ∀˜b∀x ≤∗ b [A(x)]
[∃xA(x)] :≡ ∃˜b∃x ≤∗ b [A(x)].
The formula [A] can be viewed as a relativisation of the quantiﬁers in A to the modelM, since ∀˜b∀x ≤∗ b A(x), for instance,
is equivalent to ∀x(∃˜b(x ≤∗ b) → A(x)).
Although this solves the problem of interpreting the modalities, we have now changed the way free-variables are dealt
with (through thedifferent treatment of quantiﬁers). This leads to a secondproblem,namely the interpretationof the additive
connectives, since the interpretation presented in Section 2 relies on the if-then-else term constructor (z)(t0, t1), which is
not monotone8 on the argument z.
In summary, this ﬁfth interpretation of the modalities is sound given a prior relativisation of quantiﬁers to the model of
strongly majorizable functionals. This relativisation, however, conﬂicts with the interpretation of the additives given above.
We conclude this section with two results. First, we show that the instantiation ρ∗ above is still sound for multiplicative–
exponential linear logic (MELLω) plus bounded quantiﬁers, when the interpretation is combined with the relativisation [·].
Second, we show that the (unsound) formula interpretation of the additives in the linear logic context still corresponds to
(an equivalent formulation of) the bounded functional interpretation of intuitionistic logic.
Theorem 9. Extend Deﬁnition 3 as
|!A|xf :≡ !∀˜y≤∗ f x |A|xy
|?A|fy :≡ ?∃˜x≤∗ f y |A|xy
|∃zρ ≤∗ t A|xy :≡ ∃z≤∗ t |A|xy
|∀zρ ≤∗ t A|xy :≡ ∀z≤∗ t |A|xy
7 We are assuming that the majorizability relation and bounded quantiﬁers have been added to the language as in [8].
8 Although (z)(t0 , t1) is not monotone, it can be easily majorized by the pointwise-maximum functional max{t0 , t1}. This is the solution used in the
context of intuitionistic logic, where the interpreted formulas are monotone on the witnessing variable. In linear logic this monotonicity property does not
hold.
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and drop the if-then-else constructor (i.e. the additives). If
A0(z), . . . , An(z)
is provable in MELLω then from this proof monotone terms a0, . . . , an can be extracted such that
z ≤∗ z∗, yi ≤∗ yi  |[A0(z)]|a0y0 , . . . , |[An(z)]|anyn
is also provable in MELLω , where FV(ai) ∈ {z∗, y0, . . . , yn}\{yi}.
Proof. We consider only the case of existential quantiﬁer
The other cases are treated similarly. 
Next, we show that by keeping the additives in the bounded functional interpretation of linear logic, through the rela-
tivisation of quantiﬁers, we obtain an equivalent formulation of the bounded functional interpretation of intuitionistic logic.
Theorem10 (Bounded functional interpretation). Let |A|xy be as in Deﬁnition 3 and Theorem9 (keeping the additives and viewing
boolean quantiﬁcations as bounded quantiﬁcations). For formulas A of intuitionistic logic let us deﬁne
AB(x; y) :≡ (|[Al]|xy)i.
The following equivalences hold intuitionistically:
(A ∧ B)B(x, v; y, w) ⇔ AB(x; y) ∧ BB(v;w)
(A ∨ B)B(x, v; f , g) ⇔ ∀˜y≤∗ f xvAB(x; y) ∨ ∀˜w≤∗ gxvBB(v;w)
(A → B)B(f , g; x, w) ⇔ ∀˜y≤∗ gxw AB(x; y) → BB(f x, w)
(∀zA)B(f ; y, a) ⇔ ∀z≤∗ a AB(f a; y)
(∃zA)B(x, a; f ) ⇔ ∃z≤∗ a ∀˜y≤∗ f xa AB(x; y).
Proof. By induction on the structure of A. Consider, for instance, the case of existential quantiﬁer
(∃zA)B(x, a; f ) ≡ (|[(∃zA)l]|x,af )i
(D1)≡ (|[∃z!Al]|x,af )i
≡ (|∃a∃z≤∗ a ![Al]|x,af )i
(D3,T9)≡ (∃z ≤∗ a |![Al]|xf a)i
(T9)≡ (∃z ≤∗ a!∀˜y ≤∗ f xa|[Al]|xy)i
(D2)≡ ∃z ≤∗ a ∀˜y ≤∗ f xa(|[Al]|xy)i
(IH)≡ ∃z ≤∗ a ∀˜y ≤∗ f xa AB(x; y).
The other cases are treated similarly. 
Although AB does not syntactically coincide with the bounded functional interpretation of intuitionistic logic (because of
the different treatment of ∨ and ∃), it is easy to see that (cf. Theorem 6)
∃˜x, a∀˜f (∃zA)B(x, a; f ) ≡ ∃˜x, a∀˜f∃z≤∗ a∀˜y≤∗ f xa AB(x; y)
⇔ ∃˜x, a∀˜c∃z≤∗ a∀˜y≤∗ c AB(x; y).
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